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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-Condition of Unseaworthiness Arising After the
Commencement of the Voyage.
Whether a seaman may recover compensatory damages for injuries
sustained by reason of a condition of unseaworthiness arising after the
commencement of the voyage is a question recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court.1 In Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,2 the
petitioner was a crew member on the respondent's vessel, which had
docked after returning from a fishing voyage and on that same day un-
loaded her cargo of fish spawn. As a result of the bags of spawn being
handed over the side rail of the ship, the rail became covered with a
slippery substance known as fish gurry. When the unloading was
complete, the petitioner prepared to go ashore. He stepped onto the
rail in order to reach a ladder on the pier, slipped and fell with resulting
injuries.
Suit was brought on the law side of the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts,8 plaintiff asking for compen-
satory damages, as well as maintenance and cure, upon alternative the-
ories: (1) The Jones Act4 for negligence, and (2) the unseaworthiness
of the vessel. The trial court charged that in order for the mariner to
be successful on either theory, the jury must find that the respondent
shipowner had actual or constructive notice of the condition of the rail-
ing on which the seaman slipped. The jury awarded maintenance and
cure but found for the shipowner on both counts of compensatory dam-
ages.5
The petitioner appealed urging as error the district court's charge
that notice of the condition of unseaworthiness was required to make
the owner liable. The court of appeals, however, affirmed, holding
'-The question was discussed and deliberately left open in Dixon v. United
States, 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1955)362 U.S. 539 (1960)
' The suit was brought on the law side of the court on the basis of Doucette v.
Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952), which interpreted the jurisdictional provi-
sions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1949) as allowing a complainant to bring his suit on the
law side of the court if his cause of action arose under the general maritime law.
This case was subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court in Romero v. Inter-
national Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). The court of appeals,
however, dismissed Trawler Racer's objection to the jurisdiction of the lower
court by reason of the "pendant" doctrine which allows action on the law side
where two counts are contained in one complaint and one could have been brought
on the law side of the court.
'41 Stat. 1007 (1929), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1958).5 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 434 (D. Mass. 1958).
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that the rule of absolute liability for unseaworthiness depended upon
conditions existing at the commencement of the voyage.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and by a 6 to 3 decision
reversed both lower courts and remanded the case to the district court
for a new trial on the issue of unseaworthiness. Relying upon Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki' and Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson8 the Court
held that the duty to provide a seaworthy ship is present at all times,
and that it makes no difference whether the condition arises before or
after the commencement of the voyage or whether the condition be
permanent or temporary.9  The Court stated that the liability of a
shipowner to provide a seaworthy ship
is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous to
other well known instances in our law. Derived from and shaped
to meet the hazards which performing the service imposes, the
liability is neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor con-
tractual in character.... It is a form of absolute duty owing to
all within the range of its humanitarian policy.10
The. three dissenting members of the Court, led by Justice Frank-
furter in an elaborate twenty-page opinion, said that the whole doc-
trine of unseaworthiness as it is applied to seamen is unfounded."1
Apparently the doctrine of unseaworthiness was first formulated 12
in 1816 by Lord Eldon in Douglas v. Scougall.13  In that case the in-
surer was sought to be held for the loss of the cargo, but the court held
that the owner must bear the responsibility for the unseaworthy con-
dition of his ship which caused the loss when such condition existed
at the commencement of the voyage. The first English case involving
the doctrine in a personal injury situation was Couch v. Steel14 which
held that the doctrine did not apply in such a case. In 1876, twenty-
' Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 265 F.2d 426 (lst Cir. 1959). The court
said that none of the cases concerned a temporary condition of unseaworthiness
which had arisen without negligence during the voyage of a ship unquestionably
seaworthy at the outset.
'328 U.S. 85 (1946). The Court held that a shipowner was liable to a steve-
dore who was injured while working on board ship by the falling of a boom which
was caused by the faulty condition of a shackle.
8347 U.S. 396 (1954). The facts of this case were essentially the same as
those in the Sieracki case supra note 7, and the decision rested upon the holding
thereof.
362 U.S. at 539.
1 362 U.S. at 549, quoting from Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85,
94-95 (1946).
11 The majority of the Court declined to re-examine the historical basis for the
doctrine. 362 U.S. at 550.
" "The ancient code imposed no duty upon the shipowner and master to take
pains to provide a staunch ship for the benefit of the mariners." Tetreault, Sea-'
men, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 Coaxzu L.Q. 381,
387 (1954).
184 Dow 269, 3 Eng. Rep. 1161 (1816).
1 3 El. & B. 402; 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854).
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three years after Couch v. Steel, The Merchant Shipping Act' 5 was
enacted by Parliament, imposing the duty of due diligence upon the
shipowner to see that the vessel was .eaworthy at the inception of the
voyage and that the ship be maintained in a seaworthy condition during
the voyage. Following this act, the House of Lords in Hedley v. Pink-
hzey & Sons S.S. Co. held that the failure to use available stanchions
and rails as a result of which a seaman was thrown overboard and
drowned did not render the vessel unseaworthy within the meaning
of the statute.' 6
The doctrine had a similar origin in the United States. In 1869 the
Supreme Court in The Northern Belle1 7 held that the shipowner's duty
to provide and maintain a seaworthy ship for the voyage was absolute
and that liability for cargo damage resulting from an unseaworthy ves-
sel must be borne by the owner of that vessel and not his insurer.
Some earlier American cases dealing with seaman's injuries im-
posed liability on the shipowner to the extent that there was negligence
by the owner, master, or mate to provide proper equipment or to cor-
rect dangerous conditions aboard ship after reasonable notice of the
existence of such conditions.' 8 In another line of cases the mariner
was allowed recovery on the basis of "unseaworthiness," but the stand-
ard imposed by this doctrine at that time was no greater than due
diligence.' 9
The right of seamen to recover for injuries caused by unseaworth-
iness was first declared in The Osceolae° in 1903, where the Supreme
Court said that the duty of a shipowner to provide a seaworthy ship
for his crew is absolute.2 ' This statement was dictum, however, be-
"The Merchant Shipping Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., c. 80, provides "that the
owner of the ship and the master, and every agent charged with the loading of the
ship, or the preparing thereof for sea, or the sending thereof to sea, shall use all
reasonable means to insure the seaworthiness of the ship for the voyage at the
time when the voyage commences, and to keep her in a seaworthy condition for
the voyage during the same."
Is [1894] A.C. 222 (Scot.). The House of Lords in fact held that the failure
to use this equipment, while not resulting in unseaworthiness, did constitute neg-
ligence on the part of those in charge of the management of the vessel but that
under the fellow servant rule no cause of action existed against the owner by
reason of the master's negligence.
1176 U.S. (9 Wall.) 526 (1869).
"The Julia Fowler, 49 Fed. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1892) ; The Frank and Willie, 45
Fed. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1891); The A. Heaton, 43 Fed. 592 (C.C.D. Mass. 1890);
Olson v. Flavel, 34 Fed. 477 (D. Ore. 1888); The Noddleburn, 28 Fed. 855
(D. Ore. 1886) ; The Edith Godden, 23 Fed. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1885) ; Halverson v.
Nisen, 11 Fed. Cas. 310 (No. 5970) (D. Cal. 1876); Brown v. The D. S. Cage,
4 Fed. Cas. 367 (No. 2002) (C.C.E.D. Tex. 1872).
"The Robert C. McQuillen, 91 Fed. 685 (D. Conn. 1899) ; The Lizzie Frank,
31 Fed. 477 (S.D. Ala. 1887).2- 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
21 The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789), appears to be the
first American-case to require the-shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel for
his crew. It should be noted, however, that a breach of the obligation. merely
permitted the seaman to leaVe the ship's service without forfeiture of wages or
19611
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cause the holding was that no recovery could be had for mere opera-
ting negligence, i.e., an improvident order given by the master. This
dictum was not followed in a subsequent lower court decision in 1905.22
In 1922, however, the Supreme Court gave new life to the dictum of
The Osceola by its opinion in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger23
where it was stated obiter that a seaman may recover for injuries sus-
tained through the unseaworthy condition of the ship. Thus dictum
was compounded with dictum and so stood the law of unseaworthiness
until 1944, when the Supreme Court decided Mahnich v. Southern S.S.
Co.24 In that case there is a clear holding that the owner's duty to
provide a seaworthy ship does not depend upon negligence. 2
More recently the doctrine of unseaworthiness has been held to
embrace more than mere physical defectiveness of the ship or equip-
ment. In Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. 28 a seaman was assaulted
by a man of a savage and vicious nature, a man whose very presence
on board ship rendered it a perilous place. The victim was allowed to
recover from the shipowner on the ground that the ship was unsea-
worthy because of the presence of the vicious attacker.
The underlying premise in the Boudoin case was that the vicious
seaman was of that nature from the beginning of the voyage. If it be
assumed that the assailant had developed his propensity for vicious con-
duct after the voyage had begun, then the question arises under the
Mitchell decision whether the shipowner would be liable to the victim
for unseaworthiness. The holding itself in the principal case would
seem to require an affirmative answer,27 yet there is language in the
Court's opinion to suggest that the owner would not be held liable in
the freak accident situation.,28
being subject to prosecution for desertion. "As late as 1832, Circuit Judge Story
viewed the obligation of the vessel and shipowner to a mariner injured in its
service as limited to maintenance and cure, with the possible exception of the
unusual case where the mariner might have received his injuries in defending
the vessel against some extraordinary peril." Tetreault, supra note 12, at 384.
"The Henry B. Fiske, 141 Fed. 188 (D. Mass. 1905).23259 U.S. 255 (1922).
2'321 U.S. 96 (1944).
2 In the Mahnich case a seaman was injured while at sea by falling from a
staging which gave way when a piece of defective rope supporting the staging
broke. The Court in a 7 to 2 decision (Justices Frankfurter and Roberts dissent-
ing) allowed the seaman to recover on the doctrine of unseaworthiness and this
despite the fact that a sound rope was on board.
28348 U.S. 336 (1955), 33 TExAs L. REv. 1081.
" The-Court held that a shipowner is liable for injuries suffered 'by a seaman
through the unseaworthy condition which arose after the commencement of. the
voyage.
" "What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish
an accident-free ship. The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a
vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard is
not -perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather every peril of
the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service." 362 U.S. at
550.
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While the Court's statement was perhaps intended to provide the
Court some escape from holding against the shipowner in every injury
case remotely connected with either the ship or its personnel, it re-
mains open to some doubt how far the holding in Mitchell will be taken
to impose its newly found- duty of the shipowner to provide a seaworthy
ship at all times. To use another example, a ship at sea encounters a
severe storm the force of which weakens the mast, thereby rendering
the ship unseaworthy. Subsequently while the ship is limping into
port where she can be repaired, the mast topples, striking and injuring
a seaman. If the shipowner incurs liability in such a case, it is difficult
to see how his duty to provide the requisite seaworthy ship can be
fulfilled while his ship is yet at sea and beyond the reach of harbor
repair facilities.
The dissent in Mitchell took the view that the Court's decision vir-
tually made the shipowner an insurer of the seaman, whereas the doc-
trine of unseaworthiness originated in both English and American
courts as a means of protecting marine cargo insurance carriers from
undue risks.
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion is the sounder, for it
recognizes that the doctrine of unseaworthiness was called into exist-
ence for one reason-the encouragement of marine insurance. It also
recognizes that the doctrine has undergone its expansion since that time
through some dubious judicial precedent. And with the decision in
the principal case it is seen that perhaps the last vestige of the his-
torical doctrine of unseaworthiness has been cast off-that element which
required the shipowner to make his ship safe for the impending voy-
age while the ship is yet in port. The shipowner is now liable without
fault before,2 9 during,3 0 and after 31 the voyage to a seaman (or one
doing a seaman's work) injured aboard his ship.
HOWARD A. KNOX, JR.
Domestic Relations-Basis of the Award of Alimony Pendente
Lite in North Carolina.
Alimony pendente lite may be awarded to any married woman up-
on her application to the court with notice to her husband during any
proceeding for absolute divorce, divorce from bed and board, or ali-
mony without divorce.1 She may receive the award whether she be
the plaintiff or the defendant in the principal action.2 If the wife is
"Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).IoMahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
"Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 50-15 (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5046 (Supp. 1959).
'Johnson v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 383, 75 S.E2d 109 (1953) ; Medlin v. Medlin,
175 N.C. 529, 95 S.E. 857 (1918) ; Webber v. Webber, 79 N.C. 572 (1878).
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merely defending the action brought by her husband and asking for
no affirmative relief, she may receive alimony pendente lite "upon a
proper showing."'3  In order for the wife to be eligible for the award
when she is seeking an absolute divorce, divorce from bed and board,
or alimony without divorce, she must set forth sufficient facts (1) to
entitle her to a divorce, either absolute or from bed and board,4 and
(2) to establish that she does not have adequate means of support
during the trial.5  Having found these facts in her favor, the court
may then order her husband to pay her "such alimony during the
pendency of the suit as appears to [it] ... just and proper, having re-
gard to the circumstances of the parties."
The amount of the award is within the sound discretion of the court,
and there will be no reversal on appeal unless there is a gross abuse of
discretion.7 There are, however, two factors that weigh upon the
exercise of the trial court's discretion-one the provision of a statute
and the other a judicial decision. G.S. § 50-14 provides that alimony
awarded upon divorce from bed and board shall not exceed one-third
of the net income of the party against whom the judgment is rendered.
'Johnson v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 383, 75 S.E2d 109 (1953) ; the court does not
say what will constitute a "proper showing." Briggs v. Briggs, 215 N.C. 78, 1
S.E2d 118 (1939), and Holloway v. Holloway, 214 N.C. 662, 200 S.E. 436(1939), indicate that the trial court need merely find that the wife's denial is
filed in good faith and that she is without adequate means of support.
"The court need not determine the type divorce to which she would be en-
titled. Little v. Little, 63 N.C. 22 (1868).
'It would appear that where the wife has ample means for her support she
will not be granted alimony pendente lite. Oliver v. Oliver, 219 N.C. 299, 13
S.E2d 549 (1941). But see Mercer v. Mercer, 253 N.C. 164, 116 S.E2d 443
(1960), where an award of $1000 plus $500 a month to a wife who had a separate
eshtte of $47,500 and an income of $6400"was sustained. The husband's estate was
valued at several hundred thousand dollars. (These figures were before the trial
court but are not in the report.) The court stated that under G.S. § 50-16 "the
fact that she has a separate estate of her own does not necessarily defeat her
right to [alimony pendente lite] .... " Id, at 170, 116 S.E2d at 448. Accord:
Rowland v. Rowland, 253 N.C. 328, 116 S.E2d 795 (1960). When the court at
the pendente lite stage examines the quality of the support due the wife according
to the means of the husband, as would be done in a permanent alimony situation,
rather than looking to her needs in excess of the amount she alone can provide,
it would appear that the literal meaning of Q.S. § 50-15 is being ignored. G.S.
§ 50-15 requires that before an award of alimony pendente lite be given the wife
the trial court must find that "she has.not sufficient means whereon to subsist dur-
ing the prosecution of the suit." But in Rowland and Mercer the awards were
made under G.S. § 50-16. That statute has no explicit requirement of such a
finding and only requires that the award be reasonable subsistence having regard
to the circumstances of both parties. Apparently G.S. § 50-15 and G.S. § 50-16
are not to be construed in pari materia.
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-15 (1950) N.C. Gmr. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1959)
uses substantially the same language and the court has not drawn a distinction
(except as suggested in note 5, supra). Under G.S. § 50-16 adultery on the part
of the wife bars all relief except counsel fees, whereas this result is questionable
under G.S. § 50-15. Bolin v. Bolin, 242 N.C. 642, 89 S.E.2d 303 (1955) (G.S.
§ 50-15); Williams v. Williams, 230 N.C. 660, 55 S.E.2d 195 (1949) (G.S. § 50-
16) ; Lawrence v Lawrence, 226 N.C. 221, 37 S.E.2d 496 (1946) (G.S. § 50-15).
SHennis v. Hennis, 180 N.C. 606, 105 S.E. 274 (1920).
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While at least one case has indicated that this one-third limitation is
not binding upon the trial court on the question of alimony pendente
lite,s our court has also said that due regard must be given to this ex-
pression of legislative intent.9 Further, Davidson v. Davidson'0 holds
that the award shall not exceed the net income that "is or should be
derived ' "1 from the estate or labor of the party ordered to pay alimony
pendente lite.
In determining the amount of the award, a significant problem is
that of the husband's ability to pay; this factor has been the subject
of two recent cases before the North Carolina Supreme Court.'2
In Conrad v. Conrad13 plaintiff wife, who was seeking alimony
without divorce, moved for alimony pendente lite. The substance of
the evidence concerning the husband's ability to pay was that as an
insurance salesman his net income during prior years had been
$10,756.16 in 1956, $15,357.94 in 1957, $8,477 in 1958 and $3,916.43
for the first eight months of 1959. Defendant husband explained his
decline in income by a reduction in commissions paid by one of his
largest accounts and an unfavorable ruling by the local insurance
board. It was not contended that the defendant had assets other than
his income capacity.' 4 The trial court found that the defendant was
capable of earning $16,000 a year and awarded the wife $600 a month
alimony pendente lite and $1,000 counsel fees. The Supreme Court
reversed. The court stated that the award is to be based on current
earnings, not upon earnings for some prior year, and that before an
award may be based upon earning capacity the trial court should find
that the husband was failing to exercise his capacity to earn. because
of a disregard of his marital obligation to provide a resonable sup-
port for his wife.
To support its requirement of a finding that the husband has disre-
garded his support obligations the court cited Davidson v. Davidson.'5
In the Davidson case the trial court had awarded alimony pendente
lite which exceeded the net income of the defendant. Although the
court conceded that the award may be based on the income capacity
' Anderson v. Anderson, 183 N.C. 139, 110 S.E. 863 (1922).
'Kiser. v. Kiser, 203 N.C. 428, 166 S.E. 304 (1932) ;, Davidson v. Davidson,
189 N.C. 625, 127 S.E. 682 (1925).10189 N.C. 625, 127 S.E. 682 (1925).11Id. at 628, 127 S.E. at 683.
1 Conrad v. Conrad, 252 N.C. 412, 113 S.E. 2d 912 (1960) ; Sguros v. Sguros,
252 N.C. 408, 114 S.E.2d 79 (1960).
18252 N.C. 412, 113 S.E. 2d 912 (1960).
" Cf. Muse v. Muse, 84 N.C. 35 (1879), where an award of three dollars a
month based on income capacity alone was sustained, there being no evidence of
any other asset belonging to the husband.
" 189 N.C. 625, 127 S.E. 682 (1925).
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of the husband,16 it reversed the trial court and the case was remanded
for additional evidence concerning the value of the husband's "entire
estate, and the net annual income that is or should be derived from his
estate or labor."'1 7  The court further stated that the ultimate object
of the proceedings was to award such alimony pendente lite as was
"just and proper having regard to the circumstances of the parties."18
If there was any doubt after Davidson as to whether the "circumstances
of the parties" provision required a finding that the husband had dis-
regarded his support obligations in order to sustain an award based on
the husband's earning capacity instead of his present earnings, there
should certainly be none after Conrad.
The husband's ability to pay arose in a different context in Sguros
v. Sguros,19 the second of these two recent cases. Plaintiff wife was
seeking alimony without divorce and moved for alimony pendente lite.
Defendant husband had a Ph.D. degree in bacteriology and at the time
the action was instituted was employed as a tobacco research technician
at an annual salary of $10,740. He had an additional income from a
Naval Reserve unit of about $1,000 a year. He had, however, resigned
from these positions and accepted a professorship at a salary of $8,000
a year. He filed an affidavit stating that the opportunities for advance-
ment in his field were greater as a university teacher than as a research
technician. There was no finding that there was any other reason for
his change of positions. The trial court awarded -alimony pendente
lite based on an annual income of $11,800. On appeal the supreme
court said, "Under the circumstances here disclosed, we hold he had
the right, so long as he acted in good faith, to accept the professor-
ship at Miami even though at a reduction in salary. The court should
have fixed the monthly payments on the basis of a salary of $8,000.""
The requirement that the husband must act in good faith in chang-
ing jobs could present a difficult question for the trial court to decide.2 '
16 "The allowance may be based on the husband's earnings, or his earning
capacity, although he is not possessed of money or property." Davidson v. David-
son, 189 N.C. 625, 628, 127 S.E. 682, 683 (1925), quoting Corpus .uris.
.7 189 N.C. at 627, 127 S.E. at 683.18 Id. at 628, 127 S.E. at 683.
" 252 N.C. 408, 114 S.E.2d 79 (1960).
2 0 Id. t 411, 114 S.E.2d at 82.
"
1If, for example, the husband were a baseball player who had for a long time
been considering entering the sporting goods business and retiring from active
sports and if he refused an offer of $100,000 for another year's play and entered
business for $25,000 a year during the -pendency of divorce proceedings, nothing
else appearing, Sguros would require that the court award alimony based an the
$25,000 job. When, however, the husband's decision to change jobs occurs ap-
parently concurrently with the divorce proceedings, then it is open to question
whether the same result would follow. Conrad and Sguros are not clear as to
whether there is a presumption of good faith on the part of the husband. The
problem of the husband's earning capacity, his good faith, etc., also arises in con-
nection with the modification of permanent alimony decrees. See generally,
Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 10 (1951).
[Vol. 39
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In Sguros the husband's change in jobs was presented in the most fav-
orable light. He was a professional man seeking advancement and
entering a highly respected new career. The appellate record indicates
that the issue of good faith was not strongly contested.2 2 There was no
evidence offered to dispute his motive. But in future cases the question
might arise whether the change in jobs would have been made had
domestic harmony continued. If it were shown that the husband would
not have changed jobs but for the discord, then perhaps an award based
upon earning capacity would be sustained.
It is submitted that Conrad and Sguros are consistent and reason-
able. Both require that the intent of the husband be examined before
an award of alimony pendente lite may be based upon the husband's
earning capacity.23 In both the basic issue is the same, i.e., Is the
husband by changing jobs and reducing his income primarily moti-
vated by a desire to avoid his support obligations? If this issue is
answered affirmatively, the wife may be awarded alimony pendente
lite based upon the husband's earning capacity; otherwise the award
must be based upon his present earnings. This appears to be a reason-
able result, for the husband should not be absolutely prohibited from
changing jobs. And, at the same time, the wife's right to support
should not be infringed when the husband does change jobs primarily
for the purpose of reducing his income and thereby the amount of
support.2 4
G. DUDLEY HUMPHREY, JR.
Evidence-Inadmissibility of State-Seized Evidence in Federal
Criminal Prosecutions-Silver Platter Doctrine.
In Elkins v. United States1 defendants were indicted in a United
States district court in Oregon for violating and for conspiracy to vi-
olate the Federal Communications Act. Before trial the defendants
moved to suppress as evidence several recordings and a recording ma-
chine which had been seized by state officers and turned over to federal
officials. The state officers had seized the evidence during a search
22 See Brief for Appellee, p. 21.
2" "The award should be based on the amount which defendant is earning
when alimony is sought and the award made, if the husband is honestly engaged
in a business to which he is properly adapted and is in fact seeking to operate
his business profitably. Sguros v. Sguros, ante, 408. To base an award on
capacity to earn rather than actual earnings, there should be a finding based on
evidence that the husband was failing to exercise his capacity to earn because of
a disregard of his marital obligation to provide reasonable support for his
wife... ." Conrad v. Conrad, 252 N.C. 412, 418, 113 S.E.2d 912, 916 (1960).
(Emphasis added.)
" The same reasoning applies where a reduction in the husband's income has
occurred without a change in jobs.
1364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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which, two Oregon state courts had found, was unreasonable. The
district judge assumed without deciding that the search and seizure
were unlawful but relied on the "silver platter"2 doctrine and denied
the motion to suppress. At the trial the articles were admitted in evi-
dence, and the defendants were convicted. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions.8 Upon granting certiorari,
the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the court of appeals and
remanded the case to the district court. The Court held that evidence
was inadmissible in a federal criminal trial over the defendant's timely
objection 4 if it had been obtained by state officers during a search which,
if conducted by federal officers, would have been unreasonable under
the fourth amendment.
In dealing with the question of admissibility of relevant evidence ob-
tained by an unreasonable search and seizure the courts are confronted
with the problem of balancing conflicting social policies.5 If the courts
make use of all relevant evidence without regard to the manner in
which it is obtained, it is said that the criminal law can be more effec-
tively enforced.6 On the other hand, it is argued that exclusion of evi-
dence obtained during an unreasonable search is the only practical
method of deterring such police illegality.7  The Court in the principal
case indicated its awareness of this problem and stated that limitations
on the process of discovering truth in federal trials should be imposed
only when other considerations outweigh the general need for dis-
closure of all relevant evidence.8
In two prior decisions the Court had implied that protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures was more important than suppress-
ing crime by illegal methods.
'The "silver platter" label was coined in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74 (1949). There the Court said, "[A] search is a search by a federal official if
he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured
by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter."
Id. at 78-79.
'Elkins v. United States, 266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1959).
' "The motion [to surpress] shall 'be made before trial or hearing unless op-
portunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds
for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the
trial or hearing." FFn. R. Calm. P. 41(e).
'"The question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained
at'a disproportionate loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social
need that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall
not be flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice."
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 24-25, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926).
6 See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 387 (1937) (dissenting opin-
ion) ; Waite, Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons, 31 MIcH. L. REv. 749, 763-
66 (1933).
" See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) ; Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128, 151 (1954) (dissenting opinion); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 40,
41 (1949) (dissenting opinions).
'364 U.S. at 216.
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A unanimous Court in Weeks v. United States" held that evidence
obtained by federal officers during an unreasonable search and seizure
in violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible in a federal
criminal prosecution. However, the Court refused to exclude evidence
obtained by state officers using methods contrary to the fourth amend-
ment because "the Fourth Amendment is not directed to, individual
misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reach the Federal Govern-
ment and its agencies."10  The Weeks rule was extended by subse-
quent decisions to exclude evidence in federal prosecutions where fed-
eral agents participated with state officers in an unreasonable search and
seizure" or where the state officers acted solely on behalf of the United
States.12
In Wolf v. Colorado13 the Court held that in a state criminal pros-
ecution the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not
require the exclusion of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizeure even though such evidence would be excluded in federal
prosecutions. However, the Court said, "The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit
in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause."' 4 Thus the Court recognized
that the federal constitution embraces a right of privacy enforceable
against the states and their agencies. But the Court, granting that ex-
clusion may be an effecive remedy against arbitrary intrusion, said
that the requirements of due process were fulfilled if a state consistently
applied other remedies15 to enforce this basic right.
Because of the continued adherence to the rule that evidence uncon-
stitutionally obtained by state officers was admissible in federal pros-
ecutions, 10 an anomalous situation was created by the Court's decision
- 232 U.S. 383 (1914).20 Id. at 398.
"Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
1" Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). In this case liquor seized
by state officers after an unlawful search of the defendants' automobile was ad-
mitted as evidence against the defendants in federal court where they were tried
for violation of the National Prohibition Act. The Court held it was error to
admit thd evidence. At the time of the search and seizure there was no sugges-
tion that the defendants were committing any state offense; therefore, the state
officers had acted solely on behalf of the United States.
13 338 U.S. 25 (1949). For a discussion of this case, see Allen, The Wolf
Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Ciiil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1
(1950).
14 338 U.S. at 27.
"For example, the victim of an illegal search may have a tort action for
damages against the searching officer. The state may dismiss the offending officer
or prosecute him in a criminal proceeding. In this respect, see Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, at 30-32 n. 1 (1949).
" "My view that the Supreme Court has not overruled the Weeks decision ...
is further reinforced by the fact that seven United States Circuit Courts of Ap-
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in Benanti v. United States.y7 In Benanti the Court held that evidence
obtained by state officers in violation of section 605 of the Federal Com-
munications Act' s was inadmissible in federal courts even though it
was obtained without assistance from federal officers.' 9 Thus prior
to the principal case the courts excluded evidence obtained solely by
state officers in violation of a federal statute but admitted evidence
which they seized in violation of the Constitution. It would seem that
more effect was given to the statute than to the Constitution. The
Court in Elkins recognized this anomaly and stated that it would be
logically impossible to justify such a policy.20
In the principal case the Court gave several reasons for its decision.
First, exclusion is the only effective way to compel respect for the con-
sfitutional guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Second, the new rule will avoid needless conflict between state and fed-
eral courts because the federal courts will no longer admit evidence
illegally seized by state officers and thereby frustrate the attempt of
the states having the exclusionary rule to preserve constitutional guar-
anties. Third, the new rule will encourage free and open cooperation
between state and federal law enforcement officers. The Court stated
that the old rule "implicitly invites federal officers to withdraw from
such association" since participation by a federal officer in an unreason-
able search conducted by state officers renders evidence so obtained
inadmissible in the federal courts. Fourth, the imperative of judicial
integrity requires that the federal courts should not be "accomplices
in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold."
Lastly, the Court concluded that the Wolf decision had removed the
"foundation" or "doctrinal underpinning" of the Weeks admissibility
rule. The Court stated that the basis of the rule admitting state-seized
evidence was that "unreasonable state searches and seizures12 1 did not
peals and several United States District Courts in the other circuits ... have
continued to adhere to it since and notwithstanding the Wolf decision." United
States v. Blackman, 183 F. Supp. 545, 547 (D.D.C. 1960) (Pine, J.).
I355 U.S. 96 (1957), 37 N.C.L. Rlv. 88 (1958).
18 "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any com-
munication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person...." 48 Stat.
1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1958).
2 The Court construed § 605 as requiring the exclusion of evidence obtained
by wire tapping even though the section contains no reference to the admissibility
of such evidence. The first case holding wiretap evidence to be inadmissible in
federal court was Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). However,
in that case the tap was made by federal officers.
20 364 U.S. at 215.
-1 It seems that the Court used the phrase "unreasonable search and seizure"
to mean unreasonable when compared with the standards of the fourth amend-
ment. Weeks founded the admissibility rule on the fact that conduct of state
officers did not violate the fourth amendment even though the same conduct on
the part of federal officers would amount to an unreasonable search and seizure.
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violate the federal constitution. Then the determination in Wolf that
the fourteenth amendment prohibits "arbitrary intrusion by the police"
was interpreted by the Court as meaning the amendment prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers."
Implicit in this conclusion-that Wolf removed the foundation of
the admissibility rule-is the assumption that conduct of state officers
violates the fourteenth amendment if the same conduct on the part of
federal officers would violate the fourth amendment. This was clearly
pointed out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion, and he
stated that the majority was guilty of a "complete misconception of the
Wolf Case."' '
It is important to note that the only question before the Court in
Elkins was the admissibility of evidence. No constitutional question
was necessarily involved. The majority stated, "What is here invoked
is the Court's supervisory power over the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts .... 23 In the exercise of this power the
Court, in reviewing convictions in the federal courts, is not confined
to the ascertainment of constitutional validity but may establish civi-
lized standards of procedure and evidence.2 4 Therefore, it would seem
that the Court in the principal case could have reached the same result
without reference to the constitutional question raised by the Wolf de-
cision-whether every "unreasonable search" which violates the fourth
amendment is also an "arbitrary intrusion" which violates the four.
teenth amendment.
The Court in Elkins referred to the experience of the states in adopt-
ing the exclusionary rule and noted that their movement toward this
rule has been hesitant but seemingly unrelenting. The Court also stated
that its decision would not affect the freedom of the states to develop
and apply their own sanctions.2 5 At the present time about one-half
of the states have adopted the exclusionary rule.26 North Carolina ad-
""The identity of the protection of the Due Process Clause against arbitrary
searches with the scope of the protection of the Fourth Amendment is something
the Court assumes for the first time today. It assumes this without explication
in reason or in reliance upon authority, and entirely without regard for the essen-
tial difference, which has always been recognized by this Court, between the
particularities of the first eight Amendments and the fundamental nature of
what constitutes due process." 364 U.S. at 239-40 (dissenting opinion). "The
scope and effect of these two constitutional provisions cannot be equated, as the
Court would have it." Id. at 238. The significance of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
statement that the majority is guilty of a complete misconception of Wolf is more
apparent when it is recalled that he wrote the majority opinion in Wolf.
" 364 U.S. at 216. This power of supervision is embodied in FED. R. CPm . P.
26.
" McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
"This would seem to suppress any idea that the next step by the Court will
be to overrule Wolf and apply the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions.
"0 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960) (app.).
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mitted evidence obtained during an illegal search until 195327 when the
excIusionary rule was adopted by statute.28
Although the Court's consideration of the question of constitution-
ality of state searches and seizures could have best been avoided by
adhering to the policy of deciding a case on other than constitutional
grounds if at all possible,29 its pronouncement, of a rule of evidence
seems sound. The uniformity achieved in federal criminal prosecutions
by applying the same rule regardless of whether the search is by state
or federal officers is wholly desirable.
G. MARLiN EvANs
Torts---Res Ipsa Loquitur-Unexplained Automobile Accidents.
In Lane v. Dorney1 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to unexplained
single-car automobile accidents. The plaintiff relied on Etheridge v.
Etheridge2 as holding that res ipsa was applicable to such accidents.
The court stated, however, that the doctrine was not applied in Eth-
eridge.
In Etheridge the defendant was driving along a dirt road at a moder-
ate rate of speed. As the defendant crossed an intersection his car
swerved to the right, ran into a ditch, and turned over. The defendant
offered testimony that he was not able to turn the car back toward the
center of the road for some unknown reason and that his brakes did
not seem to take hold. The court held that the evidence was sufficient
to withstand a nonsuit. Though the words "res ipsa loquitur" were
not used, the court stated the applicable rule to be as follows:
When a thing which caused an injury is shown to be under the
control and operation of the party charged with negligence and
the accident is one which, in the ordinary course of things, will
not happen if those who have such control and operation use
proper care, the accident itself, in the absence of an explanation
by the party charged, affords some evidence that it arose from
want of proper care.... The rule has found limited application
in automobile cases. It applies when the accident is one which
"State v. Vanhoy, 230 N.C. 162, 52 S.E.2d 278 (1949); State v. Simmons,
183 N.C. 684, 110 S.E. 591 (1922); State v. Wallace, 162 N.C. 623, 78 S.E. 1(1913).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §15-27.1 (Supp. 1959).
For a discussion of the use of illegally obtained evidence in state courts, see Note,
33 N.C.L. REV. 100 (1954).
' "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(concurring opinion).
1250 N.C. 15, 108 S.E.2d 55 (1959).
2222 N.C. 616, 24 S.E.2d 477 (1943).
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does not happen in the ordinary course of events where reason-
able care is used, and the cause of the accident or the loss of con-
trol resulting in the accident, such as an obstruction in the road,
a flat tire, or skidding, does not affirmatively appear.8
This portion of the Etheridge opinion has been cited and relied up-
on by the North Carolina court in other unexplained automobile acci-
dent cases in which the jury was allowed to decide the question of
negligence.4 In addition Etheridge has apparently been interpreted by
the bar of North Carolina as applying res ipsa.5 And furthermore, the
language used in Etheridge is quite similar to the classic definition of
res ipsa loquitur, enunciated in Scott v. London & St. Katherine Dodks
Co." In view of the similarity of the rules enunciated in Etheridge and
London Docks, it is not difficult to understand how it was "mistakenly"
thought that res ipsa was applied by the court in Etheridge.7
The facts before the court in Lane v. Dorney are as follows: Mr.
Dorney was driving the automobile on a clear night, accompanied by
Mr. Lane in the front seat and Mrs. Lane and Mrs. Dorney in the back
seat. Mr. Dorney was in good health, and his vehicle was in good
mechanical condition. The highway was hard surfaced, eighteen feet
wide, and had dirt shoulders three feet wide. The surface was dry
and free from defects. No other travelers were using the highway at
the time and place of the accident. As the vehicle was proceeding
downhill on a long, sweeping curve to the left, it ran off the road to
the right over an embankment, apparently jumped a stream, and was
completely demolished. Mr. Dorney and Mr. Lane were, killed. A
tire track was discovered on the right shoulder leading over to the em-
bankment; there was no evidence to suggest thai the vehicle had left
the road at any place other than as indicated by the tire mark'. Mrs.
Dorney, the only witness, testified as follows:
3Id. at 619, 24 S.E2d at 479-80. (Emphasis added.)
' Edwards v. Cross, 233 N.C. 354, 64 S.E2d 6 (1951); Wyrick v. Ballard
Co., 224 N.C. 301, 29 S.E.2d 900 (1944); Boone v. Matheny, 224 N.C. 250, 29
S.E.2d 687 (1944).
5 Affidavits from disinterested attorneys show their belief that the Lane de-
cision was a departure from the rule of Etheridge as to the application of res
ipsa to unexplained single-car collisions. Petition to Rehear, p. 23, Lane v. Dorney,
252 N.C. 90, 113 S.E.2d 33 (1960).
'3 H. & C. 596, 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (1865). "There must be reasonable evi-
dence of negligence. But where the thing is shown to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from want of proper care." Id. at 601, 159 Eng. "Rep. at 667.
""The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently applied the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in a civil action for personal injuries arising out of an unexplained
automobile accident." Note, 21 N.C.L. Rav. 402 (1943). It is also interesting to
note that of the thirty-nine cases cited and relied upon by the court in Etheridge,
thirty three cases expressly dealt with the applicability of res ipsa.
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I was not conscious of anything unusual happening on the road
before... this crash. I do not know whether there was any
skidding of the car before the crash.... I was not conscious of
any swerving of the car while it was on the paved portion of the
road. I was not conscious of the car hitting anything in the road
or anything of that sort.8
On the first appeal of this case the court, after refusing to apply
res ipsa, affirmed the nonsuit entered below and stated,
Negligence is not presumed from the mere fact of injury....
There must be legal evidence of every material fact necessary to
support a verdict, and the verdict "must be grounded on a reason-
able certainty as to probabilities arising from a fair considera-
tion of the evidence, and not a mere guess, or on possibilities."...
Testing plaintiffs' evidence by these principles in determining its
sufficiency to show negligence.., in the operation of the auto-
mobile, the question is left in the realm of conjecture and sur-
mise. Just what happened to bring about the "great impact" as
characterized by Mrs. Dorney is pure guesswork.9
Had this been the final decision on the case, the result would seem
to have been a reversal of Etheridge and a readoption of the rules re-
quiring that negligence be established by affirmative evidence.10  How-
ever, upon rehearing the case, the court reversed the trial court and its
own prior decision and held that even though the doctrine of res ipsa
was not applicable, there was sufficient evidence of negligence to with-
stand a nonsuit. The court stated:
There was no evidence of a blowout, of blinding lights, of skid-
ding, or of mechanical defects, or of negligence on the part of
another traveler. Thus Mrs. Dorney's evidence, though some-
what negative, nevertheless tends to remove everything that
might have influenced the movement of the car, causing it to
leave the road, save and except the hands of the man at the
wheel.... Why Mr. Dorney drove off the road may be "guess-
work," but the fact remains he Was at the wheel and in control
of the vehicle when it left the road."
In view of this decision on rehearing it is difficult to understand
why the North Carolina Supreme Court was so emphatic in enuncia-
ting that res ipsa will not be applied in these cases. 12 The apparent
' Lane v. Dorney, 250 N.C. 15, 18, 108 S.E.2d 55, 57 (1959).
'Id at 21, 22, 108 S.E.2d at 59, 60.
10 Lane v. Dorney, 250 N.C. 15, 108 S.E.2d 55 (1959) ; Sowers v. Marley, 235
N.C. 607, 70 S.E.2d 670 (1952); Mills v. Moore, 219 N.C. 25, 12 S.E.2d 661
(1941).11252 N.C. at 94, 113 S.E.2d at 36 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
12 This doctrine is applied in similar cases in a number of other jurisdictions.
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utilization of this doctrine in North Carolina has not met with any
dissent in the past. In addition, though the court stated that the doc-
trine would not be applied, it appears that the court did in fact utilize
the underlying principle of res ipsa in reaching its decision.
Res ipsac loquitur, as applied by a majority of the states, is a rule
of probabilities arising from circumstantial evidence.' 3 The rule is
used only when the cause of the accident is not affirmatively shown and
it is necessary to rely upon the circumstances to determine cause.1 4 If,
when all the facts and circumstances surrounding an accident are con-
sidered, it is more probable that the accident resulted from negligence
of the defendant than from some other cause, the issue of negligence
will be submitted to the jury. 5
In the principal case the court held that the physical facts and sur-
rounding circumstances presented a case for the jury.16 Concededly,
circumstantial evidence may be used to establish affirmatively some
particular negligent act or forbearance on the part of the defendant.
For example, evidence that the automobile continued a long distance
after the collision and did serious damage in the process would tend to
For example, in a Minnesota decision a car ran off the road on a curve and over-
turned. The court stated that "the car left the paved road, went over the shoulder,
and turned over. This made a prima facie case of negligence for plaintiff....
Such is the rule of res ipsa loquitur which is applicable." Nicol %. Geitler, 188
Minn. 69, 73, 247 N.W. 8, 10 (1933). The California court considered these
facts: There was no obstruction or defect in the pavement, which was level,
dry, and twenty-two feet wide. The evening was clear and there was no indica-
tion that any other vehicle had been near defendant's automobile at the time of
the accident. The defendant testified that she did not know what caused the
car to go off the road and collide with the tree. The court stated: "Since it can-
not be successfully claimed that an automobile would ordinarily leave a ... high-
way under the circumstances shok.n in the instant case ... without at least some
negligence on the part of the person who was in exclusive control thereof, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must be applied." Fiske v. Wilkie, 67 Cal. App. 2d
440, 447, 154 P.2d 725, 729 (Dist. Ct App. 1945). See also Ralston v. Dossey,
289 Ky. 40, 157 S.W.2d 739 (1941) (auto left road in attempting to pass and
turned over trying to return to the highway); Lindsey v. Williams, 260 S.W.2d
472 (Mo. 1953) (auto left highway and collided with a tree); Smith v. Kirby,
115 N.J.L. 225, 178 A. 739 (1935) (auto left highway and struck a tree) ; Morrow
v. Hume, 131 Ohio St. 319, 3 N.E.2d 39 (1936) (auto left road and hit a tele-
phone pole). See generally Ghiardi, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Wisconsin, 39 MMQ.
L. REV. 361 (1956); Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 C.Lin. L. RL.
183 (1949); Note, 37 B.U.L. R-v. 213 (1957); Note, 40 VA. L. Rnv. 951 (1954).
"'See PaossER, ToRTs § 43 (2d ed. 1955). See also Note, 3 UTAH L. REV.
113 (1952).
", Lea v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 246 N.C. 287, 98 S.E.2d 9 (1957);
Payne v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 205 N.C. 32, 169 S.E. 831 (1933) ; Springs
v. Doll, 197 N.C. 240, 148 S.E. 251 (1929).
" Wyrick v. Ballard Co., 224 N.C. 301, 29 S.E.2d 900 (1944) ; McRainey v.
Virginia & C. So. Ry., 168 N.C. 570, 84 S.E. 851 (1915).
" Note the following statement regarding the meaning of res ipsa: "The doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur . . . does not mean that negligence can be assumed from
the mere fact of an accident and injury, but ... is a short way of saying that
the circumstances attending upon the accident are in themselves of such a char-
acter as to justify a jury in inferring negligence as the cause of the injury."
Barger v. Chelpon, 60 S.D. 66, 70, 243 N.W. 97, 98 (1932).
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establish that the automobile was traveling at excessive speed.17 Simi-
larly, evidence that two vehicles approached each other on a street in
the daytime, and one driver did not see the other vehicle, though his
view was unobstructed, would tend to establish that this driver failed
to maintain a proper lookout."' However, this is not the sole manner
in which circumstantial evidence may be used. The evidence may not
only be used to establish a definite negligent act on the part of the
driver, but it also may be used to establish that it was more probable
that the accident was caused by negligent conduct on the part of the
defendant than by something for which he would not be responsible.
The latter usage is embodied in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and,
it is submitted, is the usage of circumstantial evidence adopted by the
court in the principal case.
The refusal of the courts to apply res ipsa in a two-car accident
indicates that the application of the doctrine depends upon circumstan-
tial evidence which tends to establish negligence as the more probable
cause of the accident, as distinguished from circumstantial evidence
establishing a definite act of negligence. This refusal is based upon the
theory that in such cases it is not more probable that one driver, rather
than the other, was negligent.' However, if the application of res ipsa
depended upon circumstantial evidence tending to establish a particular
negligent act as the cause of the accident, the doctrine could easily be
applied to multi-car accidents.
The evidence of Mrs. Dorney, though of a negative nature, was
accepted by the court as affirmatively removing certain causes of the
accident which, if proved by the defendant, would relieve him of liabil-
ity. It is settled that testimony by a witness that he was not aware
of certain events, when the witness was-in a position to observe these
events had they occurred, raises a positive inference that they did not
occur.2 0 Thus the fact that Mrs. Dorney, a passenger in the defend-
ant's car, was not aware of any unusual happening on the road, any
skidding of the car, any blinding lights of other travelers, or the car's
hitting anything in the road tended to remove these factors as possible
causes of the accident. This evidence, however, did not affirmatively
"'Volksen v. Kelly, 12 N.J. Super. 202, 79 A.2d 319 (App. Div. 1951);
Yokeley v. Kearns, 223 N.C. 196, 25 S.E.2d 602 (1943) ; 10 BLASrFIEL, CYCLO-
PED A OF AuTomoBins LAW & PRAcTicE § 6560 (1955).8 Rounds v. Fitzgerald, 207 App. Div. 534, 202 N.Y. Supp. 595 (1924).
" PRossER, ToRTs § 42 (2d ed. 1955). However in an action by a third party
passenger in one of the vehicles against the drivers of both vehicles, the doctrine
could be applied on the theory that both drivers were more probably negligent
than not, although this application is not commonly allowed. PRossER, op. cit.
supra at 206-07.
"Hill v. Norfolk So. Ry., 195 N.C. 605, 143 S.E. 129 (1928); Edwards v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 129 N.C. 78, 39 S.E. 730 (1901) ; Purnell v. Raleigh &
G.R.R., 122 N.C. 832, 29 S.E. 953 (1898).
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show any negligent act or forbearance on the part of the defendant
which caused the accident. The evidence merely seemed to increase
the probability that the accident was the result of some negligence of
the driver by removing these possible non-negligent causes.
The apparent utilization of the underlying principle of res ipsa and
a simultaneous rejection of the doctrine itself, as in the Lane decision,
can only lead to uncertainty as to what evidence will be required to
raise a question for the jury in unexplained single-car automobile acci-
dent cases. Under this decision it seems that where the plaintiff is
unable to present evidence which affirmatively shows the cause of an
accident, he may be able to withstand a nonsuit by producing testimony
which tends to remove possible causes of the accident for which defend-
ant would not be responsible. However, a question remains as to what
possible causes must be removed before the case can be submitted to the
jury. It appears that the plantiff must at least negative mechanical fail-
ure,2 1 skidding,22 blowouts, 23 negligence on the part of another trav-
eler,2 4 and sudden illness of the driver.25
The adoption of the doctrine of res ipsa and its application within
the limits previously established by our court26 would create a uniform
set of rules for inferring negligence from circumstantial evidence. No
such uniformity exists within the rule of Lane v. Dorney.
JoaN D. WARLICK, JR.
Wills-Construction-Right of Adopted Children To Take Under
a Will as "Grandchildren."
Adoption through judicial proceedings, a process nonexistent
under the common law, received statutory sanction in the United States
more than a century ago.' In recent years, as adoption steadily has
2 1Ferry v. Holmes & Barnes, Ltd., 12 La. App. 3, 124 So. 848 (1929).
22 Springs v. Doll, 197 N.C. 240, 148 S.E. 251 (1929).
22 Clodfelter v. Wells, 212 N.C. 823, 195 S.E. 11 (1938).
Pridgen v. Produce Co., 199 N.C. 560, 155 SE. 247 (1930).Cohen v. Petty, 65 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
"The principle does not apply: (1) when all the facts causing the accident
are known and testified to by witnesses at the trial; (2) where more than one
inference can be drawn from the evidence as to the cause of the injury; (3)
where the existence of negligent defaut is not the more reasonable probability, and
where the occurrence, without more, leaves the matter resting only in conjecture;
(4) where it appears that the accident was due to a cause beyond the control of
the defendant, such as the act of God or the wrongful or tortious act of a
stranger; (5) when the instrumentality causing the injury is not under the ex-
clusive control or management of the defendant; (6) where the injury results
from accident as defined and contemplated by law.' Spring v. Doll, 197 N.C.
240, 242, 148 S.E. 251, 252-53 (1929).
'Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743
(1956). This article contains an excellent discussion of the statutory evolve-
ment in this country of the institution of adoption. In North Carolina statutory
adoption reaches back to 1873. N.C. Pub. Laws 1872-73, ch. 155.
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become more prevalent, an increasing number of jurisdictions have
evinced a legislative intent to produce complete legal equivalence be-
tween relationship by adoption and relationship by blood.2 Despite this
legislative trend3 such equivalence has not uniformly been recognized.
One of the principal problems arising in this respect concerns the in-
clusion of adopted children within general terms of designation ap-
pearing in a will.4 In cases involving this question the result normally
is dependent on the determination of one (or both) of two considera-
tions: first, to what extent an adopted child can be included in a term
such as "children," "issue" or "descendants" as those words are used
to identify persons in relation to the adoptive parent; and second, wheth-
er an adopted child can be considered the "grandchild," "nephew" or
"cousin" of one other than the adoptive parent.
In Bullock v. Bullock5 the testator devised his farm to four of his
sons, A, B, C, and D, for life, with remainder in fee simple to their chil-
dren. The provision as to the ultimate takers of the fee simple estate
continued,
[B]ut in case either of my [named] sons should die without
leaving children capable of inheriting said lands, then . . . the
part of said land that would go to such an (sic) one, or more of
them, shall be and belong to the children of the one or those
who remain; it being my desire and intention .. . that after their
death... my grandchildren shall have the use of same.., that
is, my grandchildren from my said sons .... 6
The will was executed in 1936, and B subsequently adopted two
children, one in 1949 and one in 1950. No revision of the will was
made after its execution; in 1957 the testator died, survived by the
four named sons. Shortly afterwards A died without leaving children;
several months later B died leaving only the children whom he had
adopted. The remaining life tenants, C and D, and the three natural
children of D joined as plaintiffs in a declaratory judgment action to
obtain a construction of this item of the will. The trial court held that
the adopted children should inherit under the will as if they were the
natural children of B. The record on appeal did not show whether the
testator knew of the adoptions or had the capacity to change his will,
2 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §74-414 (Supp. 1958); Ky. REV. STAT. §199.520(2)
(1959).
For a recent comparative compilation of inheritance rights granted by the
adoption statutes of each of the American jurisdictions, see Note, 25 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 231, 242-46 (1959).
'See generally Oler, Construction. of Private Instruments Where Adopted
Children Are Concerned (pts. I and II), 43 MicH. L. REv. 705, 901 (1945). This
article furnishes an exhaustive analysis of cases bearing on this point.
251 N.C. 559, 111 S.E2d 837 (1960).
OId. at 560, 111 S.E2d at 839. The testator had one other son besides the four
named in this item of the will.
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if he had so desired, after they were effected. The supreme court, in
modifying the judgment below so as to exclude the adopted children,
held that the language used by the testator disclosed an intention that
only natural children of the four sons should take in remainder. The
appellate opinion implicitly rejected any possibility that such intent
should be determined in the .light of statutes establishing the rights of
adopted children.7
It is axiomatic that the intention of the testator is controlling in the
construction of his will; to this end certain fundamental rules are ad-
hered to as a basis for the determination of this intent. Thus, it is well
settled in North Carolina that the testator's intention is to be gathered
from the language he employed, supplemented when necessary by a
consideration of the surrounding circumstances at the time of, or after,
execution of the will.8 Therefore, if by special context or surrounding
circumstances it clearly appears that the testator actually meant to in-
clude an adopted child within a term of general designation (e.g.,
"children"), such child should take under the will without regard to
the status accorded him by the applicable adoption law.9 Conversely,
where context or a preponderance of circumstances indicate that the
term was used in a sense comprehending only persons who attained the
required relationship by birth, an adopted child will be excluded.' 0
Difficult problems of construction arise, however, when a situation
develops that the testator had not anticipated. The instant case pro-
vides a typical situation of this sort-the "grandchildren" referred to
were to be identified at a future time, after the testator's death, and at
the time of the will's execution no child had been adopted who could
assert this relationship to the testator. With reference to this class of
cases it has been said that "the only legitimate inference from the con-
text and surrounding circumstances is that the testator... has no ac-
tual intention whatever in respect to the difficulty which afterwards
arises by the appearance of an adopted child."'" If the testator had
no real "intention" concerning a problem that later arises, then the
process of construction necessarily becomes speculative.' 2  In the con-
' The opinion made no reference to the adoption statutes.
s E.g., Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632 (1953); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell, 237 N.C. 342, 75 S.E.2d 151 (1953); In re Will
of Johnson, 233 N.C. 570, 65 S.E.2d 12 (1951).
"Kales, Rights of Adopted Children, 9 ILL. L. Rnv. 149, 158 (1914).
10 In Estate of Pierce, 32 Cal. 2d 265, 196 P.2d 1 (1948), the evidence tended
to show that the testator had made provision for the adoptive parent and his
natural children upon an oral promise that the particular children in question
would not be adopted. Kales, supra note 9, at 159.
" Kates, supra note 9, at 159.
" In former days common law courts applied certain rigidly fixed rules of
construction and an answer was summarily found. GRAY, THE NATUa AND
SOURaCS OF THE LAW 174 (2d ed. 1927). Such inflexible standards have long
since lost their appeal to the judiciary. 2 PAGE, WILLS § 916, at 792 (Lifetime
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struction process most courts have taken the view that the adoption
statutes constitute a factor to be considered in interpreting the language
of the will.' 3 The position taken by the North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, does not completely accord with this premise; gen-
erally the adoption laws have been construed narrowly, on the ground
that they were in derogation of the common law.14 In a 1953 case,
Bradford v. Johnson,15 it was stated that the then existing statutes l
dealing with inheritance rights of adopted children pertained only to
intestacy, except as they served to "establish and define the parent and
child relationship between the adoptive parents and the adopted child."'1
Where a donor had died testate, inclusion of adopted children within
particular designations used in the will was deemed to depend solely up-
on ascertaining the intent of the testator, and this intent was determined
without the aid of the statutes.
Stbsequent to the Bradford case significant changes were effected
irrthe North Carolina adoption statutes. Through a 1955 amendment'3
the legislature substantively accorded to the artificial relation the exact
consequences attendant to the natural one. Thus, regarding the effect
of a final order of adoption, the statute prescribes:
The final order forthwith shall establish the relationship of
parent and child ... and... the child shall be entitled to inherit
ed. 1941) states, "They [rules of construction under the present approach] are
more like statements of fact, which indicate the inferences of fact which the
courts are inclined to draw from given states of evidence, in the absence of other
evidence which justifies or requires a different inference, than they are like rules
of law."
"E.g., in Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 7, 149 At. 515, 518 (1930), the
court stated, "In the determination as to this intention several considerations are
to be resorted to. One of these is the adoption statute in effect in the state at
the time, it being presumed that the testatrix knew and acted in contemplation of
the reciprocal rights and duties resulting from the existing statute." In Hayes
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 280 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. 1955), it was stated that in
construing wills in connection with the inclusion of adopted children the sur-
rounding circumstances and law must be considered to discover the testator's in-
tention. See Oler, stipra note 4, at 918.
Depending on whether they elevated the adoptee to the status suggested by the
particular term of designation, the statutes exerted either an exclusionary or in-
clisionary force. See Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E.2d 420 (1942) (adoptee
excluded) ; In re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn.. 211, 291 N.W. 104 (1940) (adoptee
included).
"E.g., Grimes v. Grimes, 207 N.C. 778, 178 S.E. 573 (1935). As the statu-
tory provisions surrounding adoption in this state vere expanded, much uncer-
tainty developed-both as to procedural aspects and with regard to the legal
status acquired by the adoptee. See Fairley, Inheritance Rights Consequent to
Adoptions, 29 N.C.L. REv. 227 (1951); Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N.C.L.
REV. 127 (1941) ; 30 N.C.L. Rky. 276 (1952).
"237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E2d 632 (1953).
6 N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 832; N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 879; N.C. Sess.
Laws 1949, ch. 300.
" Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 578, 75 S.E.2d 632, 636 (1953).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 813. For comment on the provisions inserted in
the adoption statutes by this chapter, see A Survey of Statutory Changes in North
Carolina in 1955, 33 N.C.L. REv. 513, 521-24 (1955).
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real and personal property by, from, and through the adoptive
parents in accordance with the statutes of descent and distribu-
tion. An adopted child shall have the same legal status, includ-
ing all legal rights and obligations of any kind whatsoever, as
he would have had if he were born the legitimate child of the
adoptive parents .... 19
The second sentence of this subsection was added in its entirety; its
terms seem unmistakably to give an adopted child the status of a child
of the body of the adoptive parents and to extend this relation to the
adopters' kin.2 0  Vith this in mind, the question arises in relation to
the Bullock case whether this change in the statutory setting should be
accorded any weight in determining the testator's intention, since it oc-
curred after the will was executed. Several factors indicate that it
properly might be considered significant in ascertaining this intent. The
status-conferring provisions of the amendment were given retroactive
effect. 2 ' While it is true that the intent of the testator must be found as of
the time he makes the will, if he designates a class, its membership can
be the subject of subsequent legal variation.
The Bullock case apparently followed the rationale of Bradford as no
reference was made to the present adoption statutes despite the broaden-
ing amendment intervening between the two decisiotis. The Bullock
opinion stated that if the only designating term appearing in the instru-
ment had been "children" of the testator's four sons, adopted children
might have been permitted to take.22  However, the use of the words
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (a) (Supp. 1959).2 1 In this connection it has been held under the present law that for purposes
of intestate succession adopted children bear the same relation to kindred of the
adoptive parent as do natural children. Bennett v. Cain, 248 N.C. 428, 103 S.E.2d
510 (1958).
"1 N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 813, § 6. The absence of vested interests in the
prospective beneficiaries eliminates constitutional obstacles. See, e.g., Butterfield
v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N.E. 602 (1900).2 The court stated as a general rule: "[W]here no language showing a con-
trary intent appears . . . a child adopted either before or after the execution of
the will, but prior to the death of the testator, where the testator knew of the
adoption in ample time to have changed his will so as to exclude such child, if
he so desired, such adopted child will be included in the word 'children' when
used to designate a class which is to take under the will." 251 N.C. at 562-63,
111 S.E.2d at 840. This statement was made on the basis of prior decisions.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 239 N.C. 612, 80 S.E.2d 771 (1954) ; Brad-
ford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632 (1953); Smyth v. McKissick, 222
N.C. 644, 24 S.E.2d 621 (1943). The Smyth case reasoned that though an
adopted child was not (then), constituted by law an heir of one other than the
adoptive parent, the adoption legally qualified the adoptee as the "child" of such
parent.
Distinctions based on the time the adoptiin occurred have been criticized. Oler,
supra note 4, at 912-14. If the testator knew and apparently approved of an adop-
tion prior to the execution of his will, it may be validly inferred that he intended
to include the adopted child. But where the devise is to a class a contrary pre-
sumption should not obtain merely because the testator dies before any adoption
was accomplished.
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"children capable of inheriting" and "my grandchildren" in conjunction
with the term "children" was interpreted to reveal the intention that only
natural children of the testator's sons should share in the devise.
By preliminary construction the words "children capable of inherit-
ing" were equated to legitimate issue of the sons. An earlier case 23 was
cited for the proposition that an adopted child* is not the issue of its
adoptive parents, "issue," according to its technical meaning, being said
principally to denote lawfully begotten heirs of the body. 24 As opposed
to this, it might have been found that use of the phrase was only a ref-
erence to a class whose membership was left to be determined at a future
time.2 5 It then would follow that the testator, evidencing no specific in-
tent, had only a general intention that any child who qualified as a mem-
ber of the class should be included as a beneficiary.26
The court, following the leaning of earlier cases from several other
jurisdictions,-r stated that "the grandchildren of a testator, nothing
else appearing, does not include an adopted child of a son or daughter
of the testator.' '28  It could be stated with equal force that mere absence
of anticipation of adoption is a neutral element, indicating only that
the testator had no definite intention regarding the matter.2 9  It then
would be but a short step to say that the intent of the legislature to
give the adopted child the same status and rights as a natural child
should not be disregarded.
Questions concerning the right of adopted children to take under a
will have produced a legion of cases emanating from virtually every
jurisdiction, but their value as authority is slight due to the wide varia-
tions in result, depending on the date of the decision and the status
"Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632 (1953).
"4Despite the strong connotation of blood relationship carried by the word
"issue," it can be forcefully asserted that the prima facie meaning of the word
has been altered by the present broad adoption statute. A well reasoned Minne-
sota opinion reached this result under a statutory provision to the effect that an
adopted child should inherit from his adoptive parents or their relatives as if he
were the legitimate child of such parents; In re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn. 211,
291 N.W. 104 (1940).
" See Kales, .supra note 9, at 172.
" In In re Collins' Estate, 393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178 (1958), this general
reasoning was followed in holding adopted children included under a designation
of "descendants." But see Oler, supra note 4, at 921.
"Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E.2d 420 (1942); Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Hall, 125 N.J. Eq. 419, 6 A.2d 124 (1939) ; Dulfon v. Keasbey, 11l N.J.
Eq. 223, 162 Atl. 102 (1932); In, re Conant's Estate, 144 Misc. 743, 259 N.Y.
Supp. 885 (Surr. Ct. 1932). Examination of these cases reveals some of the
factors which courts formerly have relied upon to exclude adopted children.
A substantial number of cases have applied a judicially evolved presumption
to the effect that when a will provides for a child of some person other than the
testator, an adopted child will not be included unless other language specifically
directs that he shall take. Annot., 70 A.L.R. 621 (1931), supplemented by 144
A.L.R. 670 (1943). Contra, In re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 104(1940).
,8251 N.C. at 563, 111 S.E.2d at 840.
20In. re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 104 (1940).
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conferred on the adoptee by the particular statutory scheme. More-
over, the problems encountered in construing a will do not lend them-
selves readily to mere reliance on precedent, since each case brings
forward a different set of circumstances.3 0 It is significant, however,
that the broadening of adoption laws in numerous jurisdictions has
been accompanied by greatly increased reliance on the statutory policy,
and the line of cases including adopted children within various desig-
nated classes has been markedly extended. 31
The court's analysis in the Bullock case perpetuates an uncertainty
in this area of the law that the 1955 addition to the adoption statutes
apparently was designed to resolve. Naturally it is preferable, where
terms of general designation are employed in a will, that the instru-
ment state explicitly whether an adoptee is within the intendment of
the expression used. If this is not done, it is submitted that the de-
dared legislative policy in North Carolina should be treated as a strong
factor in favor of the inclusion of adopted children.
32
WILLIAM B. RECTOR, JR.
302 PAGE, WiLs § 917, at 799-800 (Lifetime ed. 1941) : "An attempt . . . to
construe the separate phrases and clauses of the will in accordance with pre-
cedents is likely to lead at once to a total disregard of testator's intention, unless
it happens that in the two wills taken each as a whole testator's intention is sub-
stantially the same, and to be carried out in the same way. Such a coincidence
rarely happens except in the introductory clause and the attestation clause of a
will."0 E.g., Estate of Heard, 49 Cal. 2d 514, 319 P.2d 637 (1957) ; Breckinridge
v. Skillman's Trustee, 330 S.W.2d 1726 (Ky. 1959); Hayes v. St Louis Union
Trust Co., 280 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. 1955); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336
Mo. 17, 76 S.W.2d 685 (1934) ; In re Collins' Estate, 393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178
(1958); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 328 S.W.2d 326 (Civ. App. Tex. 1959).
32 The weight this recommended constructional preference should be accorded
might vary with the presence bf other circumstances in a given case. The possi-
bility of fraudulent misuse of adoption proceedings seems to influence judicial con-
sideration of this problem. Oler, supra note 4, at 923-28. In this connection it
should be remembered that the procedural safeguards of the statutes bring about
scrutiny of all the circumstances surrounding any adoption.
